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Hale's Legacy: Why Private
Property is Not a Synonym for Liberty
ILANA WAXMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In the decades since the Reagan Revolution of 198o, conservative
libertarians have launched a concerted attack on the modern regulatory
and welfare state as a tyrannical intrusion on the individual liberty of
property owners.' The contemporary Republican Party has been
remarkably successful in portraying labor laws, environmental
regulation, and state-sponsored ificome redistribution programs as an
illegitimate restriction on property owners' basic freedom to use their
property as they see fit.' Indeed, the laissez-faire belief that the state
should not interfere with private property manifests itself in a wide array
of Bush Administration policy proposals, from the elimination of the
estate tax to the privatization of Social Security.3
The idea that property rights are synonymous with individual liberty
has been particularly influential within the legal academy. In its most
extreme form, the prominent legal scholar Richard Epstein has argued
that under the Fifth Amendment, property owners should be
compensated any time a government regulation or entitlement program
diminishes the value of their property So far, Epstein's suggestion has
proved too radical even for the conservative Rehnquist Court. While the
Court did apply the Takings Clause as a significant brake on government
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May 2o06.
i. See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Don't Mourn, Organize: Big Business Follows Joe Hill's Entreaty
to US Political Dominance, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jan. I, 2005, at 26; William Greider, The Right's
Great Ambition: Rolling Back the 2oth Century, THE NATION, May 6, 2003, at II.
2. For an analysis of the ideology of this "property rights movement" and the institutions that
promote it, see Douglas Kendall and Charles Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis And
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 509-14,528-54 (1998); Harvey M.
Jacobs, The Politics of Property Rights at the National Level: Signals and Trends, J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N,
Mar. 22, 2003, at I8t-97; Greider, supra note 1, at i I.
3. See, e.g., David Corn, Dark Days Ahead, THE NATION, Nov. 22, 2004, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doC/20041 122/corn; Greider, supra note 1, at II.
4. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN X-Xi
(1985). For a critical analysis of Epstein's proposals, see Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian
Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986).
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regulatory power in the i98os and 199os, more recently it has upheld the
government's ability to regulate in a variety of circumstances without
compensating the affected property owners.5 The laissez-faire view of
regulation as an illegitimate intrusion on the rights of property owners,
however, has not disappeared. Notably, it remains influential within the
Federalist Society, a powerful right-wing legal organization whose
members include the newly confirmed Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito.6
These property-rights arguments are not new. During the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was legal orthodoxy that
property owners had a natural right to use their property as they wished,
and that state interference with that prerogative threatened the very
basis of individual liberty.7 Federal courts of the so-called Lochner era
routinely struck down legislative efforts to regulate or redistribute
existing wealth as an unconstitutional intrusion on the "Substantive Due
Process" rights of property owners. However, at a time of widespread
5. The primary cases in which the Rehnquist Court established the takings clause as a significant
limitation on government regulatory power are Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015-20 (1992) (holding it to be a per se taking where an environmental regulation eliminates all
economically beneficial use of a parcel); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 836-
39 (1987) (limiting the power of state and municipal governments to impose conditions on a building
permit); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391-92 (i994) (further limiting the power of state and
municipal governments to impose conditions on a building permit); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 628-30 (2001) (holding that a landowner may assert a taking claim for a regulation that was
already in place when he acquired title). For an analysis of the Rehnquist Court's takings
jurisprudence as a substantial restriction on state regulatory power, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings
Clause, 8o N.C. L. REV. 713,714-15 (2002); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost Of Lochner: Modern Takings
Doctrine and its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 626 (1996); Andrew W.
Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings,
22 UCLA J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2003). However, the Rehnquist Court's more recent jurisprudence
limited the scope of the earlier takings cases. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335-38 (2002), the Court declined to extend the per se
takings rule in Lucas to a temporary moratorium on building. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.
Ct. 2074, 2086-90 (2oo5), the Court held that the Takings Clause did not require federal courts to
review regulations of general application to determine whether they "substantially advance" a
legitimate public interest. Likewise, in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663-64 (2005),
the Court made it clear that it would defer to the judgment of the legislature in determining whether
the condemnation of private property through eminent domain is for a legitimate "public purpose."
6. David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in '82, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2006, at A5; Charles Lane, Roberts Listed in Federalist Society '97-'98 Directory, WASH. POST, July 25,
2005, at AoI; David G. Savage, Engaged in a Very Civil War: The Federalist Society Has Reshaped the
Legal System Without Ever Going to Court, L.A. TImEs, Nov. 1I, 2005, at At; Jeffrey Rosen, The
Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 17, 2005, at 42-46; Terry Carter, The IN CROWD:
Conservatives Who Sought Refuge Within the Federalist Society Gain Clout, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at
46.
7. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of
Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 634-35 (1998).
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (i905), struck down a New York minimum hours law for
bakers as an unconstitutional interference with freedom of contract and property. The decision
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unemployment, labor unrest, and dramatic inequality of wealth, this
single-minded protection of property rights generated widespread public
outrage9 and was ultimately discredited, thanks in part to a group of
progressive legal scholars who systematically critiqued the Court's
underlying conception of private property as a sacrosanct sphere in
which the government should not interfere.'"
For those of us who are dismayed by the growing political
dominance of this libertarian conception of property, it seems
particularly important to understand the historical fate of these
progressive critiques. This Note will explore that fate by sketching a brief
history of the legal and academic influence of Robert Hale, a progressive
law professor and economist of the 192OS-I940s who has proved to be
one of the most enduring of the Lochner-era critics. Although Hale's
critique of private property and the free market fell into obscurity after
his retirement in 1949, it was revived in the 1970s, and has been the
subject of considerable scholarly interest for the past two decades."
Indeed, Richard Epstein recently described Hale as "one of the most
formidable and persistent foes of laissez-faire" who "has long been an
intellectual thorn in the side" of laissez-faire's defenders. I"
This Note seeks to explore how Hale's arguments about the nature
of property were received and used by his peers, and how they have been
used (or ignored) since his death by left-leaning legal thinkers and
economists who favor strong state regulation and redistribution of wealth
to ensure a more egalitarian society. Part I gives an overview of Hale's
alternative conception of property rights. Part II discusses some of the
ways that Hale's contemporaries drew upon his critique of property
during the 192OS-I940s to undermine the conservative property-rights
inspired Justice Holmes' famously acerbic dissent on the grounds that "the Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id. at 57. Lochner has given its name to a period
roughly between 189o and 1937 when federal courts became notorious for striking down Progressive
worker and consumer protection laws on the grounds that they interfered with due process rights to
property and contract. The Lochner era and the doctrine of economic substantive due process came to
a decisive end in 1937 when the Supreme Court began to uphold Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. See
Molly McUsic, Redistribution and the Takings Clause, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 617,619-21 (David Kairys ed., 3 d ed. 1998).
9. In a striking manifestation of this popular animosity, the Saturday Evening Post in 1912
endorsed a congressional plan to permit popular impeachment of Supreme Court Justices. Barry
Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson Of Lochner, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1394 (2001).
1o. For a discussion of the progressive attack on laissez-faire conceptions of property, see
BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW
AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 1-17 (1998); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-I96o, 3-7, 162-67 (1992); Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms-American
and Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 134-35 (2002).
II. FRIED, supra note Io, at vii-viii.
12. Richard Epstein, The Assault that Failed: the Progressive Critique of Laissez-Faire, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 1697, 1697-98 (1999).
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arguments against the emerging regulatory and social welfare state. Part
III traces the decline of Hale's prestige in the face of the Cold War
liberal consensus of the 195os and i96os, beginning with the publication
of his 1952 post-retirement opus, Freedom Through Law, and
culminating with Charles Fried's leftist call for a "new property." Part IV
describes Hale's revival in the 1970s, and analyzes a number of the
arguments that Hale's critique of property has been used to support
since. By examining this history, I attempt to explore the rise and fall of
left-wing legal arguments about property, liberty, and the role of the
state over the course of the twentieth century, and suggest some reasons
for these arguments' broader decline.
I. HALE'S CONCEPTION OF PROPERTY
Robert Lee Hale taught at Columbia Law School from 1922 to 1949,
where he was part of a community of progressive, reform-minded law
professors and economists.'3 While he was perhaps best known among his
peers for his technical studies of public utility regulation,'4 he is
remembered today for a series of works challenging the laissez-faire
understanding of private property, contract, and the free market as zones
of individual liberty and free choice. The most famous and influential of
these were his 1923 article Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, his 1943 article Bargaining, Duress, and Economic
Liberty, and his career-crowning magnum opus, Freedom through Law:
Public Control of Private Governing Power.'5
Throughout these works, Hale rejected the libertarian conception of
property as a bulwark of individual liberty against a coercive state.
Instead, Hale characterized property as a form of "private governing
power" which gives property owners tremendous coercive power over
non-owners.'6 Hale pointed out that "any person, in order to live, must
induce some of the owners of things which he needs, to permit him to use
13. Gerald Fetner, The Law Teacher as Legal Reformer: 19oo-t945, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 508-
09 519-25 (1977); Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, J. EcoN. PERSP.,
Summer 2001, at 173, 176, 179.
14. Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases: The Legal
Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 264 0973) [hereinafter Samuels, Economy as
a System of Power].
15. These are the works that are most often cited in contemporary discussions of Hale. A
Westlaw search on March 9, 2005 retrieved 237 hits for Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 489 (1923) [hereinafter Hale, Coercion and
Distribution]; 152 hits for Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L
REV. 603, 604 (i943) [hereinafter Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty]; and 52 hits for
ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER (1952)
[hereinafter HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW]. Other Hale articles retrieved fewer than 40 hits. See also
Alexander, supra note io, at I43-44.
16. Samuels, Economy as a System of Power, supra note 14, at 399-401.
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them."'" This is not a problem for "those who own enough property,"
because their property gives them "sufficient liberty to consume, without
sacrificing any of their liberty to be idle."' 8
For property owners, the state's protection of their property
essentially gives them a "right to squeeze income out of the community"
by living off the income from their capital assets.'9 In addition, "the
owner of every dollar has, by virtue of his law-created right of ownership,
a certain amount of influence over the channels into which industry shall
flow" and "the individuals with the most dollars exercise the most
control over the channels."2 Those who lack extensive property, on the
other hand, have relatively little influence in the marketplace. Moreover,
since "the law which forbids [the non-owner] to produce with any of the
existing equipment, and the law which forbids him to eat any of the
existing food, will be lifted only in case he works for an employer,"'" the
law of property essentially "coerces [non-owners] into working for
factory owners."2 Where there are extreme inequalities of wealth and
property-ownership, therefore, the private governing power granted to
property owners is "as capable ... of destroying individual liberty as is
public government itself."23
Hale's most fundamental insight was that the coercive power exerted
by private property owners is itself a creature of state power. The
effective meaning of a property right, Hale argued, is that the owner "can
insist on other people keeping their hands off" his property and "the
government will back him up with force." 4 By protecting the owner's
property right, Hale noted, the government is coercing the non-owner by
"forcing [him] to desist from handling it, unless the owner consents. '' 5 As
a consequence, Hale contended, "the government's function of
protecting property serves to delegate power to the owners" over non-
owners, so that "when the owners are in a position to require nonowners
[sic] to accept conditions as the price of obtaining permission to use the
property in question, it is the state that is enforcing compliance, by
threatening to forbid the use of the property unless the owner's terms are
met." 6
Given that all property essentially constitutes a delegation of state
power to the property owner, Hale argued, laws that alter the scope and
17. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 15, at 6o4.
18. Id. at 627.
i9. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 15, at 489.
20. Id. at 490-9I.
21. Id. at 473.
22. Id.
23. Hale, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note i5, at vii.
24. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note i5, at 6o4.
25. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 15, at 471.
26. ROBERT HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 15, at 380.
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distribution of property rights cannot be rejected as an illegitimate
intrusion of the state's coercive power onto the liberty of the property
27owner. On the contrary, state coercion is already present in every
property relationship and economic transaction "in the form of the
enforcement of property rights assigned to different individuals
according to legal rules laid down by government."" As a result, Hale
argued, existing property rights may be an illegitimate form of
"unplanned government intervention which restricts economic liberty...
drastically and.., unequally.,
29
Accordingly, Hale called upon legal thinkers to question the
legitimacy of existing property rights, and to seriously explore alternative
property arrangements that might better serve the common good.0
Rather than attacking government regulation and redistribution as an a
priori infringement of the liberty of property owners, therefore, Hale
urged his peers to analyze such laws to determine whether they enhance
"the sum total of worthwhile individual liberty" in society as a whole.3'
II. HALE IN His TIME: THE SUCCESSFUL ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE
A. THE EARLY ASSAULT: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE NEW DEAL
When Hale published Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State in 1923,32 the laissez-faire conception of property had
been under attack for decades by a broad array of progressive, populist,
and socialist political movements. The economic dislocation and
inequality of late-nineteenth-century industrialization led many
American workers and farmers to believe that the existing economic
structure was fundamentally unjust, and they responded by demanding
new forms of state intervention in the economy ranging from a graduated
income tax to the outright abolition of private property.33 This outrage
only grew when the federal courts struck down early attempts at labor
regulation and redistribution as unconstitutional intrusions on the
sanctity of private property.4 Indeed, the recurring waves of labor
conflicts and social unrest that rocked American society between the
189os and the 1920S made it seem entirely plausible that there could be a
27. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 15, at 628.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Samuels, Economy as a System of Power, supra note 14, at 269-71.
31. Hale Papers, Folder 9r-4 at 2, quoted in Samuels, Economy as a System of Power, supra note
T4, at 357-66. See also Samuels' discussion of Hale's concept of "net enlargement of liberty." Id. at
357-68.
32. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 15.
33. See Alexander, supra note io, at 134-36.
34. Friedman, supra note 9, at 1394.
[VOL. 57:1009
HALE'S LEGACY
socialist uprising in this country.35
In light of this massive social upheaval, Hale's generation of
progressive legal scholars and economists found the laissez-faire
conception of property to be outmoded and inadequate.36 As one scholar
put it, in the face of "an unplanned and undirected industrialism, and its
imminent hazards to life, liberty, and property," the courts of the
Lochner era were attempting to "fix the current limits of...
government" according to a Lockean conception of property that was
developed in eighteenth-century England to provide "safeguards
against ... the kind of stuff the Stuart kings used to pull."37 Throughout
the 1920s and 30s, therefore, Hale's peers mounted a broad assault on
the idea that the law should automatically protect the rights of yroperty
owners without regard to broader social consequences. Hale's
characterization of property as a state-enforced form of private
governing power was incorporated into this ongoing progressive
challenge to existing conceptions of property.
Probably the most comprehensive adoption of Hale's ideas came in
John M. Clark's influential economics textbook on the Social Control of
Business, published in I926." Echoing Hale's Coercion and Distribution,
Clark argued that in a modern industrial society, "the property owner's
right to exclude others... serves mainly as a basis of the bargain with
them for their services."'4 Accordingly, the "formal liberty" of the
property owners "needs to be limited in order to prevent substantial
economic coercion."'" To defend individual liberty in the face of these
new forms of economic coercion, Clark contended, society must develop
new "rights of persons, not of property," even if the growth of these
rights comes "at the expense of some of the former rights of property
owners to use their property as they saw fit."42
Other scholars drew upon other aspects of Hale's work to argue that
the law of property should be more responsive to contemporary social
needs. Underhill Moore, for example, used Hale's Coercion and
Distribution to call for greater experimentation in the rules governing
property.43 Moore, one of Hale's peers at Columbia, chided the more
35. See HORwTrz, supra note io, at 25-26; Alexander, supra note io, at 134-36.
36. See Alexander, supra note io, at 134-35; Rutherford, supra note II, at 174; Morton Horwitz,
History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1828 (1987).
37. Walton Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 88o (1932).
38. See Alexander, supra note 1o, at 134-35; Horwitz, supra note 36, at 1828; Rutherford, supra
note 13, at 174.
39. JOHN M. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (2d ed. 1939). For a discussion of Hale's
influence on Clark, see Samuels, Economy as a System of Power, supra note 14, at 267.
40. CLARK, supra note 39, at 115.
41. Id. at Iii.
42. Id. at i9.
43. Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923).
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orthodox scholars of his day for failing to recognize that, as Hale argued,
"the policy of laissez-faire is the policy of maintaining existing
institutions.., and that of necessity it commits the government to
opposition to changes in them."' This failure to recognize the state's role
in defining property rights, he argued, led these scholars to treat "the
institution of property as a single problem to be settled a priori" through
a policy of non-intervention with the rights of property owners. Moore
roundly criticized this "rationalization of the existing" at a time when
legal scholars should be seeking out "existing and potential means of
initiating rational manipulations" of property law to adapt to "changes in
material culture." 45
Felix Cohen, on the other hand, used Hale's conception of property
to call for a brake on new forms of property that were not in the public
interest, arguing that courts should not grant corporations a property
right over their trademarks unless they could demonstrate such
recognition would truly benefit society.46 Cohen cited Hale's Coercion
and Distribution for the proposition that "what courts are actually doing"
by recognizing these new property rights was "creat[ing] and
distribut[ing] a new source of economic wealth or power" by establishing
"inequality in the commercial exploitation of language."'47 He suggested
rather ironically that the protection of trademark "might be justified by a
demonstration that privately controlled sales devices serve as a
psychologic base for the power of business monopolies, and that such
monopolies are socially valuable in modem civilization.
' ' 8
Hale's call for a fundamental rethinking of the nature of property
was echoed by other legal scholars of the period who did not cite Hale
directly. Morris Cohen's 1927 masterpiece, Property and Sovereignty, for
example, characterized property as a form of state-delegated coercive
power in a way that closely paralleled Hale's characterization of property
in Coercion and Distribution, published in I923. 49 Cohen, like Hale,
noted that to the extent that things "which the law calls mine" are
"necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a
power, limited but real, to make him do what I want," so that "the
primary effect of property on a large scale is to limit freedom."5' Once
property is properly viewed as a law-derived form of coercive power,
44. Id. at 615-16.
45. Id.
46. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach, 35 COLUm. L. REv.
809, 816-17 (935).
47. Id. at 816.
48. Id. at 814.
49. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); see also HoRwrrZ,
supra note io, at 164 (discussing Hale's role in laying the groundwork for Cohen's "masterpiece").
5o. Cohen, supra note 49, at 12, i8-i9.
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Cohen argued, "we can no longer maintain Montesquieu's view that
private property is sacrosanct and that the general government must in
no way interfere with or retrench its domain."5' Instead, echoing Hale,
Cohen argued that "if the large property owner is viewed, as he ought to
be, as a wielder of power over the lives of his fellow citizens, the law
should not hesitate to develop a doctrine as to his positive duties in the
public interest."52
B. THE TRIUMPH OF THE NEW DEAL AND THE TURN TOWARD
CONTRACT LAW
With the election of Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court's
1937 decisions upholding the New Deal, it appeared that the progressive
assault on the laissez-faire conception of property had been successful.
Indeed, by the early 1940s, Hale's peers began to treat it as an accepted
fact that "the whole regime of property, as my friend Professor Hale has
long pointed out, is a system of legitimized coercion."53 Ironically,
however, even as Hale's ideas about property entered the mainstream,
his peers shifted their focus away from the aspect of his work that
questioned the underlying legitimacy of existing property rights.
After all, not all of Hale's peers in the 192os and 193os had shared
his original idea that "to champion the cause of the economically
underprivileged they had to drastically revise the laws of ownership.
5 4
As one recent scholar noted, the goal of most progressive attacks on the
laissez-faire concept of property was merely to lay "the theoretical
groundwork to justify... the emergence of the regulatory and welfare
state," not to call for a "wholesale restructuring of the American
economy."55 With the New Deal firmly established, Hale's peers in the
1940S were no longer interested in using his work to fundamentally
question the law of property itself. Instead, Hale's ideas about property
and coercion were used almost exclusively to argue for modifications in
contract law to allow the weaker party to escape enforcement where
economic inequality between the parties was unduly great .
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 26.
53. Edwin W. Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 731 , 742
('943).
54. Fetner, supra note 13, at 522.
55. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 199o DUKE L.J. 375, 386 (190o).
56. Of course, this use of Hale's work to attack laissez-faire contract doctrine was not new. From
the beginning, Hale's work was recognized as critiquing both property and contract law as twin aspects
of the legal basis of economic coercion. See, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-
An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931), which cited Coercion and Distribution as one of the
works that influenced Llewellyn's own thinking in his influential 1931 disquisition on contract
doctrine. Id. at 7o6 n.8. See also Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of
Fair Exchange in Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (935), which cited Hale to support the
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John Dalzell, for example, cited Hale in his 1942 article on Duress by
Economic Pressure, which argued that "no basic difference exists
between economic duress and physical duress. 5 7 In making this
argument, he described Hale's Coercion and Distribution and Force and
the State: A Comparison of Political and Economic Compulsion as
foundational articles which, "when enough research and analysis have
been done to make the problems in the field of economic duress
reasonably understandable,... will be given the credit which they
deserve for calling attention to some major errors in our ideas of
contract.'8
John Dawson likewise paid homage to Hale in his seminal 1947
article on economic duress, in which he argued that since "the freedom
of the 'market' was essentially the power of individuals and groups to
coerce one another, with the power to coerce reinforced by agencies of
the state itself," courts should invoke the doctrine of economic duress
where a contract results in "excessive and unjustified gains that are
directly traceable to disparity in bargaining power."59 Like Dalzell,
Dawson cited Hale's Coercion and Distribution as a foundational article,
noting that "the present article draws heavily on his analysis" and that it
was "a pleasure to record the writer's great indebtedness to him."
6
,
Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit showed a similar
appreciation of the importance of Hale's theory of property to the
doctrine of economic duress in Frank's withering dissent in M. Witmark
& Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co.6' Frank argued that in upholding the
grant of an injunction against a lyricist who had assigned away his right
to renew his copyrights at a time when he was "notoriously
inexperienced in business, and ... in desperate financial straits," the
majority was behaving "as if, today, laissez-faire were still in fullest
bloom. '62 He then treated his audience to a brief critique of laissez-faire
rooted in Hale's conception of property as a delegation of state power to
property owners:
proposition that "the freedom from regulation postulated by laissez-faire adherents is demonstrably
non-existent and virtually inconceivable," given that "bargaining power exists only because of
government protection of the property rights bargained" and that inequality of bargaining power "can
scarcely be eliminated in a capitalist economy which must enforce the inequalities of property rights
that produces those results." Id. at 1o91-92, IO96. Indeed, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty
was published in 1943 as part of a Columbia Law Review symposium on The Future of Compulsory
Contract.
57. John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 2o N.C. L. REV. 237, 237 (942).
58. Id. at 239 n.5.
59. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective. 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 266, 290
(1947).
60. Id. at 253.
61. 125 F.2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 955, 962.
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The theory of laissez-faire was that the state, the government, was not
to interfere beyond a bare minimum. That such was not the actual
practice, even when laissez-faire was in its zenith, has been brilliantly
shown in the writings of Robert Hale, beginning in 1923. His thesis
may be paraphrased thus: In outward appearance, under let-alone-ism,
the extensive use of state power is rejected. In fact, however, there is a
transference of much of the State's power to individuals .... [T]he
individual has a right to refuse to sell or use his property on any terms
or except on his own terms. If someone else tries to make him sell or
use it except on those terms, the State, through its courts and sheriffs,
will protect him from such intrusions .... Laissez-faire does not mean
that the State has given up most of its "interferences," but that the
State is used to "interfere" in new ways at the demand of individuals.
63
Within the realm of contract law, then, Hale's conception of
property as a form of state-delegated coercive power had become a part
of the mainstream legal doctrine of the 1940s. Somewhere along the way,
however, legal scholars had abandoned the more radical implications of
his work. While the above works powerfully employed Hale's critique of
property to argue that contract law should not be blind to economic
inequality, their arguments no longer called for a fundamental rethinking
of property rights. As it turned out, this presaged a near-total decline of
Hale's ideas about the nature of property in the Cold War legal academy
of the late 195os and i96os.
III. COLD WAR LIBERALISM AND HALE'S DECLINE
A. THE 1950S AND COLD WAR LIBERALISM: HALE BECOMES IRRELEVANT
By the time Hale retired from Columbia in 1949, his arguments
about property were beginning to seem like relics from an earlier era. In
part, this was a result of the state-interventionist consensus that he had
helped to build. To most mainstream legal scholars, the legal and moral
legitimacy of the welfare state seemed unassailable, and they saw no
need to go on justifying the government's right to interfere with the
rights of property owners. Indeed, in the last years of his teaching career,
Hale's courses were considered somewhat "outdated," since "many of
the crucial issues -particularly those related to government regulation of
business-no longer sparked the controversy and enthusiasm that they
had" in the I92OS and I930S. 4 At the same time, the rise of Cold War
anti-Communism gave renewed vigor to the idea that private property
was a bulwark of American liberty, and made it much more difficult to
question the underlying legitimacy of existing property rights. This
emerging Cold War liberal consensus, and the accompanying decline in
scholarly interest in Hale's ideas about the nature of property, are very
63. Id. at 963.
64. Fetner, supra note 13, at 508-09, 519-25.
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evident in the reception to Hale's 1953 opus, Freedom Through Law.65
Lon Fuller, for example, praised Hale's "strong sense of social
justice," and emphasized that he did not disagree with Hale's "practical
conclusions... (such as the desirability of a steeply graduated income
tax)." However, he characterized Hale's critique of laissez-faire
property rights as "saying that since the rich man could not hold his own
against the mob without the aid of the law, the law, having been particeps
criminis to an economic inequality, may properly salve its conscience by
taking something from the rich and giving it to the poor."6' While Fuller
noted that this critique of property "no doubt... had its origin in a
desire to refute a line of reasoning found in certain decisions of the 'old'
Supreme Court according to which property, being a 'natural' institution,
should be left alone by the legislature," he argued that this conception of
property threatened to undermine "the essential distinction between our
regime and that of Russia." 68 Ultimately, therefore, Fuller found that
Hale did not "offer a system of thinking about law and economics that
can rofitably be applied to the solution of problems now confronting
US.
3
Frank L. Knight, former president of the American Economics
Association, was even more explicit in linking Hale's arguments to the
threat of communist totalitarianism. While he recognized the "need for
some provision -beyond voluntary charity-for having the strong, or
fortunate, share the burdens of the weak, or relatively unlucky," he
argued that the free market "has been shown to represent the utmost in
free association" and that the state should only "exceptionally...
interfere with market freedom by coercive regulation."'7 In Hale's
"general dislike for freedom in business enterprise," and tendency to
make freedom "interchangeable with equality," Knight found a
dangerous "pretense ... that any great or rapid change in society can be
artificially brought about without at the outset destroying freedom and
gambling on some dictatorship."7' Libertarian economist Ludwig von
Mises went even further, directly asserting that Hale's critique of
property rights would lead to "totalitarianism of the type of the Hitler
Zwangswirtschaft."'2
The book did receive a few unconditionally positive reviews. A
65. See HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 15.
66. Lon L. Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms-A Review of Robert L.
Hale's "Freedom Through Law," 54 COLUM. L. REV. 70,70-71 (i954).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 73-74. 8o.
69. Id. at 70.
70. Frank L. Knight, Book Review: Freedom Through Law, 39 VA. L. REV. 871 , 877-78 0953).
71. Id. at 873-74 & n.5.
72. Ludwig von Mises, Freedom is Slavery, THE FREEMAN, Mar. 9, 1953, at 410, 410-1I.
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reviewer in the overtly radical Lawyers Guild Review, found the book
"painstakingly and skillfully done... some of the best legal analysis that
has been done in recent legal writing."73 A Notre Dame professor found
Hale's thesis "flawless," noting the considerable theological support for
Hale's arguments that property laws "should promote the common
good," and that "[l]aws (including property laws) which promote
indefensible inequalities are bad laws."74 Another reviewer praised Hale
for opposing "the tyrannies of private government in the same spirit in
which free men are wont to resist official tyranny," approvingly citing
Hale's argument that since property owners can behave "like petty
sovereigns ... every lawful economic power becomes a type of political
power.... "" Even the more positive reviews, however, generally found
that "in a sense [the book] is dated" by Hale's discussion of government
regulations "concerning which there is now no debate." 6 As one
reviewer put it, Hale's critique of property rights "was iconoclastic in the
days when the American bar seemed near success in attempting to write
Herbert Spencer into the constitution," but was not of great interest to
the generation of the I950s. 7"
B. THE I96OS: NEW PROPERTY As BOTH LIBERTY AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
As the reviewers of Freedom Through Law might have predicted,
Hale's arguments about property were virtually abandoned by the legal
academy for the remainder of the 195os and I96os: Hale was still
occasionally cited in discussions of economic duress and
unconscionability in contract law.79 Even there, however, his ideas were
often reduced to such mundane propositions as the fact that all contracts
73. Thomas I. Emerson, Book Review: Freedom Through Law, 13 LAW. GUILD REV. 139, 140
(953).
74. Thomas Broden, Jr., Book Review: Freedom Through Law, 28 NoTRE DAME L. 435, 438,443 &
nn.36-37 (1953).
75. Edmond Cahn, When Owners are Rulers, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1953, at BR14.
76. Stanley Rose, Book Review: Freedom Through Law, 6 VAND. L. REv. 958,959-60 (1953).
77. Harvey Mansfield, Book Department, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCL, May 1953, at i89.
78. Barbara Fried notes Hale's lapse into obscurity in FrED, supra note Io, at vii. See also Frank
Michelman & Duncan Kennedy, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFS'RA L. REv. 711, 751
(x98o) (lamenting that Hale's work had "sunk into oblivion"). This was confirmed by my own
research. A JSTOR search and a systematic examination of a number of major law journals not in
JSTOR failed to turn up a single article discussing or citing Hale's ideas about property between 1954
and i97I.
79. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, I 5
U. PA. L. REv. 485,501 n.49 (1967) (citing Hale as "somewhat peripheral for our purposes, but of great
interest on the general problem of duress and quasi-duress in a contract context"); see also Clyde W.
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 532-33 & n.27 (969)
(citing Hale to argue that the compulsory character of collective bargaining agreements does not
render the union contract "so unique that it should be considered a thing apart, for many other




involve some form of "bargaining power,"" that "unequal bargaining
power does not, in itself, make the contract invalid,"'" and that under the
doctrine of duress an entire contract is voidable if the free will of one
party was overcome by threats."
In part, this lapse into obscurity is probably due to the simple fact
that Hale and his peers had retired and been replaced by a new
generation of scholars. Moreover, as described above, the Cold War
liberal consensus made his critique of property appear unnecessary, in
that the legitimacy of the welfare state was no longer in doubt, and at the
same time, suspiciously close to communism in its more radical
implications. However, there was another factor that made it particularly
unlikely that Hale's critique of property would be revived.
In 1964, one of the most influential left-wing legal scholars in the
country published an article attacking the efforts of Hale's generation of
reformers to justify "the triumph of society over private property" and
arguing that their "idealistic concept of the public interest [had]
summoned up a doctrine monstrous and oppressive."' Charles Reich, in
The New Property, argued that the laissez-faire thinkers were
fundamentally correct to define private property as "the very foundation
of individuality." ' Indeed, he echoed Knight and von Mises in arguing
that the denial of the "absolute character of property" was one of the
defining traits of feudalism, Nazism, and Soviet communism.
5
For Reich, however, this conception of property as the guarantor of
liberty was not an argument against government regulation and
redistribution of wealth. Indeed, he believed that there could and should
be "no retreat from the public interest state" which "promises the best
life that men have ever known"8 Rather, Reich revived the laissez-faire
argument to argue that welfare entitlements should be treated as a vested
property right."7 Only by extending property rights in this way, he argued,
could the state provide the necessary "property base for civil liberties" in
"the highly organized, scientifically planned society of the future" in
which "the misery and injustice of the past" have been replaced by
8o. Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453, 455 n.18
(i96i) (criticizing the Supreme Court's invalidation of business contracts as unconscionable).
8I. Recent Developments: Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions in Uninsured Motorist
Insurance, 15 STAN. L. REv. 113, 118 & n.26 (1962) (arguing against mandatory arbitration of
uninsured motorist claims based on res judicata).
82. William A. Reppy, Jr., Contracts Prohibiting Removal of Cases Are Valid if Reasonable, 17
STAN. L. REV. 299,308 n.58 (1965).
83. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733,771 (1964).
84- Id. at 733.
85. Id. at 770.
86. Id. at 778, 786.
87. Id. at 785-87.
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"prosperity, leisure, knowledge, and rich opportunity open to all. ' 88 For
Reich and the generation of young progressive legal scholars that he
inspired, property rights would, after all, be the source of both liberty
and economic justice. Hale's critique of property, therefore, would have
seemed irrelevant or even counterproductive.
IV. HALE REVIVED
A. THE I970s: LAW AND ECONOMICS UPSETS THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS
Within less than a decade of the publication of The New Property, it
became evident that Reich's vision of a property-based social welfare
state would not be realized." Instead, by the early 197os, the most
dynamic force in the law proved to be a laissez-faire philosophy that used
the language of economics to attack the welfare and regulatory state as
an inefficient, unjustified intrusion on the rights of property owners?0 In
the face of the libertarian tendencies of the Law and Economics
movement, Hale suddenly seemed relevant again. Certainly, it seemed
that way to Warren J. Samuels, a progressive economist who responded
to these Law and Economics arguments by reviving Hale's analysis of
property rights as a form of coercive state intervention in the economy.9
Samuels' first attempt to reanimate Hale's analysis of property came
in a 1971 article for the Journal of Law and Economics.92 Samuels used
Hale's conception of property to discuss Miller v. Schoene, a 1928 case
which found no unconstitutional taking of property where the plaintiffs'
cedar trees were destroyed under state statute to protect neighboring
apple orchards from cedar rust.93 Samuels noted that Justice Stone had
defended the statute on the grounds that "it would have been none the
less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing
nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards."" He argued
that the Miller Court had essentially recognized that "government is
present in either case: it is present with respect to the already existing law
of property," which would have allowed the cedar owner to injure the
apple orchard owner, "and it is present under the 'new, altered law of
property" which protected the apple orchards by injuring the cedar
88. Id. at 777,786.
89. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960--
1973, at 141 (1993).
9o . FRIED, supra note io, at viii.
91. Samuels acknowledged his reliance on Hale's analysis in these articles in Warren J. Samuels,
On the Nature and Existence of Economic Coercion: The Correspondence of Robert Lee Hale and
Thomas Nixon Carver, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 1027, 1046-47 n.2 (1984).
92. Warren J. Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J.L. & ECON.
435 ('971).
93. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-79 (1928).





Echoing Hale, Samuels argued that this operation of property law in
Miller exemplifies "an ubiquitous economic decision-making process"
where "market forces emerge and take on shape only within the pattern
of, inter alia, legal choices as to relative rights, relative exposure to
injury, and relative coercive advantage or disadvantage."" Legally
recognized property rights, therefore, "are in effect capacities to
participate in the economic decision-making process as a coercive force;
they define and delineate loci and conditions of power."' Ultimately,
then, Samuels argued, the question of whether or not the state should
compensate property owners for a regulation that harms their property
comes down to a policy choice as to which interests should be left
exposed "to costs shifted by others," and which interests should be
protected by the state.9
Samuels elaborated on this argument in a 1974 article which drew
upon Hale's ideas to develop a more systemic critique of the idea that
"eminent domain principles" could be "consistently applied to
regulation.., so as not to adversely affect preexisting economic value."'
Samuels noted that "potentially compensable losses are virtually
infinite," given that nearly every change in the law has an adverse effect
on the value of someone's property rights. "o Moreover, as Hale argued,
legal rights "do not exist in isolation, but always relative to other persons
who may bear the negative externalities of the rightholder's choices or
actions..'.
This "dual nature" of property rights means that "for Alpha to have
a new right is for Beta to have an additional exposure to Alpha's
decision-making."'" For Samuels, "the legal significance of these
economic realities is that every change of the law enhances some and
restricts other opportunity sets and therefore both benefits and injures
the economic value of pre-existing rights.""' 3 Government regulation of
Alpha, therefore, "only alters the patterns of exposure and loss and of
interests which the law protects," since Alpha's prior right to use his
property free of regulation "also created injury" to Beta."° Given "the
elements of arbitrariness and sacrifice which are necessarily involved in
95. Samuels, supra note 92, at 441.
96. Id. at 44o.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 442.
99. Warren J. Samuels, Commentary: An Economic Perspective on the Compensation Problem, 2t
WAYNE L. REV. 113, 117 (974).
too. I at 116-17.
ioi. Id. at 122.
102. Id.
103. Id.
io4. Id. at 122-23.
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the reconciliation of competing interests," Samuels argued, the question
as to whether a property owner should be compensated for a regulation
that causes economic loss "is a matter of public choice" whose policy
implications should not be evaded through "the legal pretense that rights
have an abstract antecedent existence that government is obligated to
protect. , , "°
Samuels also made a more direct attempt to bring Hale's arguments
about property to the attention of the legal academy through a mammoth
law review article on Hale's life and work.' 6 He described Hale's work as
a call for
the correction of the gross disparities of power, both within the market
and without it, in the form of rights and wealth acquired through legal
inequality.., but with cautious regard that sacrifice of the intensive
margin not lead to retrogressive disincentive effects or further, though
different, tyrannies.7
In this spirit, Samuels urged his readers to take up Hale's "refusal to
accept the status quo on its own terms alone" and "to analyze the forces
out of which it developed and not merely take them for granted non-
deliberatively."""
B. THE I98OS: HALE TAKES His PLACE IN THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES CANON
Despite Samuels' best efforts, however, the legal academy did not
truly revive Hale's analysis of property until the early i98os. Hale's
critique made its next appearance in a pioneering attack on the
"economic justifications for the legal institution[ ] of private property" by
Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman, two left-leaning Harvard
professors.'"
Hale's influence on their argument is not immediately apparent, as
the bulk of the article consists of a series of law-and-economics style
thought experiments through which Michelman and Kennedy set out to
refute the idea that private property is the most efficient way to
maximize wealth and social welfare."' In the course of this analysis,
however, they noted "the style of thought we are urging, and the
skeptical conclusions to which it leads, were commonplace for a
105. Id. at I18, 134.
1o6. Samuels, Economy as a System of Power, supra note 14.
IO7. Id. at 367.
io8. Id. at 371.
io9. Michelman and Kennedy, supra note 78, at 712.
11o. After comparing the contemporary private property regime with such hypothetical
alternatives as a rights-free state of nature, a forced-sharing property regime, and a regime of universal
common ownership, they concluded that given the right factual circumstances, any of these regimes




preceding generation of legal scholars... culminat[ing] in the work of
Robert L. Hale, a highly distinguished precursor of the contemporary
school of economics-inspired legal policy analysts ..... Indeed, they went
to far as to say that Hale's work "virtually anticipates our thesis; had it
not sunk into oblivion, there would have been no occasion for this
paper."
Within a few years of Michelman and Kennedy's article, a group of
left-wing legal scholars who called themselves part of the Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) had taken up Hale's critique as one of the "cornerstones"
of their critique of the economic status quo."3 One strand of this CLS
critique, pioneered by Kennedy, took an extremely theoretical approach
to Hale's ideas, emphasizing his affinities with the post-modern
"deconstructive" philosophies of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida."4
Another strand of CLS, more interesting for my purposes, used
Hale's ideas as a basis for proposing concrete modifications in the rules
of property law that would have a dramatic effect on the distribution of
social power. In what he later called an "effort to impersonate Robert
Hale .." a young professor named Richard Michael Fischl caused
considerable stir by proposing one such modification that would
fundamentally alter the nature of economic relations in a capitalist
economy. ' 6 With a simple change in the law of property, he suggested,
every factory worker could be legally presumed to own the products of
her labor and be entitled to sell them at a profit after "tender[ing] to her
boss an amount in cash equal to the cost of the necessary materials and
their procurement, the reasonable rental value of her workspace.., and
the apportioned cost of other managerial expenses......
Joseph William Singer, another CLS professor, proposed a more
practical application for Hale's ideas in The Reliance Interest in
III. Id. at 751.
I12. Id.
113. Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L. REV. 421,422 (1990).
Hale has come to play such a central role in left-wing legal thought that Duncan Kennedy has said, "I
sometimes think my epitaph will be: 'One of those who, beginning in the late i97os, initiated the
revival of Hale."' Id. at 441 n.i68.
114. See, e.g., Gary Pellet, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. i15i, 1236-37
(1985). Indeed, by i99o, Duncan Kennedy found Hale's assertion that our "particular legal regime" of
private property "is responsible for the distribution of income that we actually get" to be
"uncontroversial but also not very interesting." Rather than critiquing property law in his most
extensive essay on Hale, Kennedy chose to focus on "non-class distributive conflicts" such as "conflicts
between blacks and whites and between men and women" by combining Hale's ideas with the "post-
structuralist methodology" of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes
of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING, ETC. 83, 97, 100, 124 (993).
115. Richard Michael Fischl, The Epidemiology of Critique, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475,476 (2003).
116. For a discussion of the public response to this proposal, see id. at 475-79.




Property.' 8 Singer had previously argued that Hale's conception of
"property rights as delegations of public power" meant that questions
about the proper scope of government regulation of property "can be
answered only by reference to moral and policy considerations; they
cannot be answered merely by reference to the general principles of
private property.""... In The Reliance Interest in Property, he attempted to
apply this idea to the plant closings that have been ravaging America's
industrial heartland since the i980s.'2°
Singer discussed Local i330, United Steel Workers v. United States
Steel Corp.,'2 ' a case in which the steelworkers union sued U.S. Steel in
an attempt to prevent the company from shutting down its Youngstown
plant.'22 The court in Steel Workers had rejected the union's claim that a
property right had been created by U.S. Steel's long relationship with the
community of Youngstown.'23 Drawing on his analysis of Hale, Singer
argued that "the courts should have recognized the workers' property
rights arising out of their relationship with the company," because
"property rights are more often shared than unitary, and rights to use
and dispose of property are never absolute."'2 4 Essentially, he argued, "as
Hale tried to teach us.. .the definition, allocation, and enforcement of
[property rights] represent social decisions about the distribution of
power and welfare," and "at the core of every private action is an
allocation of power determined by the state."'2 5
Given that such governmental policy decisions lie at the heart of all
property relationships, Singer argued, there is no reason that owners
should not be required to "take into account the interests of others when
they decide how to use their property. ' ' ,, 6 The Steel Workers court,
therefore, was not required to hold that U.S. Steel was the unitary owner
of the plant or to define its property rights to include "the legal power to
use it in a way that destroys a community.' 27 Instead, he argued, the Steel
Workers court should have recognized that the workers and the
community of Youngstown had a legally enforceable reliance interest in
the U.S. Steel plant. '8 In the end, he argued, "creation of this new
property right would be a modest contribution toward the effort to
curtail the illegitimate concentration of power" that is currently vested in
118. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
I 19. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465,487,491 (1988).
120. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note I18, at 614-20.
21. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 198o).
122. Id. at 1265; Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 118, at 617-20.
123. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 118, at 620.
124. Id. at 621-22.
125. Id. at 65o-5 t.
126. Id. at 659.
127. Id. at 637.
128. Id. at 635-38, 662.
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the large industrial corporations that control the economic fate of
communities all over the country:29
C. THE 1990S AND BEYOND: HALE'S ARGUMENTS IN A
POST-COMMUNIST WORLD
These attempts to use Hale's theory as a basis for concrete
suggestions about new property rules took on a new significance after the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The end of communism in Eastern Europe
was widely interpreted to mean that the U.S. system of free markets and
private property was the world's ultimate form of political and economic
organization, and should be implemented worldwide as soon as
possible. 30 In response, left-leaning legal scholars have begun to use
Hale's analysis of property to criticize the libertarian conception of
property underlying this free-market triumphalism. 3'
These scholars have emphasized Hale's insight that the legal rules
used to define the rights of property owners are policy determinations
that have a dramatic effect on the distribution of social power."'
Accordingly, they have begun to argue that if private property is the
universal system in the post-communist world, the ground rules of
property should be set in a way that takes into account the broader social
welfare rather than merely maximizing the ability of property owners to
do as they wish with their property.
Some of the more interesting and extensive of these arguments
include Karl E. Klare's Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction:
Reflections on 1989, which argued that the new legal frameworks being
constructed in Eastern Europe should focus on new forms of employee
ownership,'33 and Michael Robertson's Reconceiving Private Property,
which proposed a form of "market socialism" that would create two sets
of property rights, with more extensive ownership rights for personal
property and less extensive ownership rights for productive and
commercial property.'34
129. Id. at 650.
130. See Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989, 25 U.
BRiT. COLUM. L. REV. 69, 69-72 (5995); see Michael Robertson, Reconceiving Private Property, 24 J.L.
& Soc'y 465,466 (I997).
131. See Klare, supra note 13o, at 69-72; Robertson, supra note 13o, at 465-66; see also Note,
Distributive Liberty: A Relational Model of Freedom, Coercion, and Property Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
859,867 (994) ("[S]ocial reform should include reconfiguration of basic property rules, as well as tax-
and-transfer redistribution... Changes in property rules... can resituate people in positions that
allow them greater freedom .... ).
132. See Klare, supra note 130, at 79-82; Robertson, supra note 130, at 471-74.
133. Klare, supra note 130, at 84-9o.




In some respects, the durability and influence of Hale's critique of
property have been truly impressive. After a period of decline amidst the
Cold War liberal consensus of the 195os and I96os, his ideas have been
revived and adapted to contemporary circumstances as a way to combat
the renewed dominance of the laissez-faire view of property that he
attempted to refute in his own time. Thus far, however, his critique has
not proved to be a particularly effective weapon against the new
generation of laissez-faire property-rights advocates. While the revival of
Hale's ideas has sparked a number of interesting academic debates and
proposals, it has yet to influence the courts, much less the tenor of public
opinion. Legal scholars who have been inspired by Hale would do well to
remember that Hale's assault on property rights was supported by broad
grassroots organizations of Populists, Progressives, Socialists, and labor
unions. If we truly want to use Hale's critique of property to counteract
the recent libertarian turn in the law, we must find a way to bring his
ideas to an audience that reaches beyond the readers of law journals,
present company included.
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